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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

January 21

under date of September 24. This was the date the Senate voted its consent to the limited test ban treaty. My letter enumerated these following safeguards promised by you and members of your administration:

1. The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground nuclear test programs.

2. The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities manned by topflight scientific personnel.

3. The maintenance of facilities and resources necessary for prompt resumption of atmospheric testing in the event of Soviet abrogation of the treaty or should the national security otherwise require.

4. The improvement of our capability to detect treaty violations and Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities and achievements.

This letter estimated the bare cost of hardware to achieve these safeguards at \$1 billion and the operating costs of maintaining them at one-quarter billion dollars annually.

Eventually, under date of October 17, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission wrote me what purported to be a reply to the September 28 letter. Dr. Seaborg indicated your administration's plan to spend \$17,315,000 at the laboratories in pursuance of above-mentioned safeguard No. 2, and \$630,000 for Nevada test site improvements in pursuance of safeguard No. 1. It made no reference whatever to safeguards No. 3 and No. 4.

Promptly on October 18, I wrote you again, pointing out that the safeguards expenditures proposed by you amounted only to 1.79 percent of the amount I estimated as the required minimum. I pointed out that this considerable discrepancy indicated a basic difference in viewpoint in the following areas:

1. What actions are necessary to establish the safeguards?

2. How urgent is it to establish them without delay?

3. How much will they cost?

I also pointed out that Dr. Seaborg's letter was wholly silent as to what you may have in mind respecting the creation and maintenance of readiness for prompt resumption of atmospheric testing under emergency conditions. I also pointed out the Seaborg letter was wholly silent as to what you may have in mind respecting the improvements of our capability to detect possible violations of the treaty and to monitor Soviet nuclear weapons improvements.

Additionally, the letter expressed my hope that "you will avail yourself of an opportunity to reveal to the Nation your thinking on these important matters" either in a comprehensive reply to my communication or otherwise.

Eventually, under date of November 5, I received a terse reply from Charles E. Johnson, of your staff, stating his understanding that Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearings on the 1964 Supplemental Appropriations "offered an opportunity for a full and lengthy exchange between you and the members of the staff of the Atomic Energy Commission with respect to the questions you raised in your letter."

Mr. Johnson's understanding is quite incorrect.

The fact is that safeguard No. 2 was the subject of the hearings; safeguard No. 1 was touched only in passing; safeguard No. 3 was not within the scope of the hearings; and, neither was safeguard No. 4, although subsequently the committee on its own made a partial inspection of present detection facilities.

Realistically, I did not expect you would ever see either one of my letters, but I did expect they might be read and processed by someone on your White House staff who could be expected to have some understanding of what this mail involved. My letters

have never been properly answered and I think they should be.

However, whether I get a reply or not is far less important than the alarm I feel over the apparent inability of anyone in your White House family to understand what one is talking about when he talks of the test ban treaty safeguards and what is being done to implement them. The Atomic Energy Commission has responsibilities pertaining to them, yes, but so does the Department of Defense—particularly in connection with safeguards No. 3 and No. 4. The safeguards are a group of related actions, each of which must be carried out competently and completely in order to reduce the admitted risks and hazards of the treaty and in order to protect the national security.

I can only gather from the history of this exchange of correspondence that nobody in the White House really is in charge of defining what these safeguards are and seeing to it they are carried out. Yet a very big thing was made of them in order to get the Senate's consent to the treaty.

My second letter to you stated that the amount of money sought to implement the safeguards is such a small fraction of what many believe is needed that "it raises doubts that the entire matter of the safeguards are being taken seriously by those who may be advising you in these matters." The naive partial and incomplete responsiveness of the Seaborg and Johnson replies to my letters only reinforces these doubts.

If, in fact, at this point no one of your staff has been delegated the overall responsibility of coordinating the effort to put these safeguards into effect and making sure it is done—and done adequately—I most respectfully and urgently recommend that it be done without delay. I hope you also will consider the advisability of my early recommendation that you reveal to the Nation your thinking on the important matter of the safeguards.

In any event, I would appreciate knowing the name of your assistant who is now, or may in the future be, assigned the overall safeguards responsibility.

Very truly yours,

CRAIG HOSMER.

Understandably, Mr. Speaker, no reply was received to the November 12 letter due to President Kennedy's assassination shortly thereafter.

The following letter, taking up the matter with the new President, was written and mailed December 20, 1963:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., December 20, 1963.
Re reduction of risks and disadvantages of the limited test ban treaty.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON: On September 24, October 18, and November 12 I wrote the late President Kennedy relative to the above-captioned matter. The last letter, of course, was not answered. But replies to the first two indicated to me a matter of serious concern.

Apparent from the replies was the fact that no one on the White House staff appears to have responsibility for bringing together the important actions which both the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission must pursue if the necessary safeguards—which were promised—are to be carried out to reduce the admitted risks and disadvantages of the limited nuclear test ban treaty.

These safeguards are the following:

1. The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground nuclear test programs.

2. The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities manned by topflight scientific personnel.

3. The maintenance of facilities and resources necessary for prompt resumption of atmospheric testing in the event of Soviet abrogation of the treaty or should the national security otherwise require.

4. The improvement of our capability to detect treaty violations and Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements.

I think it is quite safe to say that so far no comprehensive and coordinated steps have been taken to insure that the safeguards are implemented. Such few actions that have been taken to date in no way measure up to the promises made to the Senate and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to obtain their concurrence to the treaty.

As a matter of fact, it is understood that serious cuts in the fiscal year 1965 budget already are being contemplated for the underground testing program.

I need not point out that notwithstanding the treaty, the Soviets are still deadly serious in their intention to rule the world. Nor need I point out their consistent ability to make substantial nuclear progress behind the secrecy of the Iron Curtain.

In order that you may be fully informed of my above-mentioned letters I am enclosing copies.

In order that the national security interests of the United States may be fully served, I am making the same recommendation to you that was made to the late President; namely, that a knowledgeable and interested member of your staff be delegated the overall responsibility for coordinating the effort to place into effect the foregoing safeguards—and making certain it is done.

With best wishes for the holiday season, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

CRAIG HOSMER.

Mr. Speaker, by January 20, 1964, no acknowledgement or reply having been received from President Johnson and the following letter was dispatched, and time alone will tell whether it, also, will be ignored:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., January 20, 1964.
Re reduction of risks and disadvantages of the limited test ban treaty.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON: On December 20, 1963, I wrote you concerning the above-captioned matter. The letter has neither been acknowledged, or has a reply been received thereto.

I am attaching a copy of the December 20 letter (less enclosures).

It is hoped that this matter will receive the serious attention the national security indicates it deserves.

Very truly yours,

CRAIG HOSMER.

America Has the Right To Know

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. CHARLES B. HOEVEN

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, January 21, 1964

Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following comments by our former colleague, Donald L. Jackson, as contained in a news release issued by Mr. Jackson at Los Angeles, Calif., on January 13, 1964:

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[In millions]

Readiness for atmospheric testing— Continued	
Johnstone /Howland /Baker/Christ- mas Island testing complex.....	\$30
Rear base logistic facilities.....	10
Upper atmosphere and space diag- nostic/detection equipment.....	50
Total.....	\$10
Detection system improvements: Clas- sified items.....	80
Miscellaneous and contingencies.....	50
Grand total.....	1,000

In addition to the foregoing capital outlays, which should be made promptly if we are to have a readiness for testing, it is estimated that the cost of maintaining, improving, and keeping this capability in constant readiness to move on an emergency basis will involve operating outlays of approximately \$250 million annually.

It is sincerely hoped that you are planning to call upon Congress forthwith for funds of the foregoing magnitude to take the actions necessary to forestall, to the maximum extent possible, the disadvantages and risks to U.S. national security and survival inherent in the partial test ban treaty. Under the circumstance I see no possible course for me but to support such a request vigorously.

Very respectfully,

CRAIG HOSMER.

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., October 17, 1963.

HON. CRAIG HOSMER,
House of Representatives

DEAR CRAIG: The President forwarded to the Commission your letter of September 24 on the question of safeguards under the limited test ban treaty. We have held up our answer until we could provide you with specific information on the outcome of planning and a review of funding requirements.

As you know, our principal assignment has been the development, in coordination with the Department of Defense, of detailed plans, such as those referred to in your letter, to assure a vigorous program of weapons development through underground testing, the maintenance of strong weapons laboratories and the retention of topflight scientists, and, in addition, a program that will enable us to maintain and strengthen our capability to resume testing promptly, should it become necessary.

I am enclosing, for your information, a copy of the President's letter of October 16, 1963, to the Speaker of the House, forwarding a request for an amendment to the Commission's fiscal year 1964 plant and capital equipment budget. This increase will be used to construct facilities, mainly in the Commission's three weapons laboratories, as a part of the safeguards program.

You will note from the President's letter that most of the Commission's part of the program will be funded by savings in and reprogramming of available and budgeted funds, and that this program will complement the measures being taken by the Department of Defense.

The President's request will undoubtedly be forwarded to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I assume there will be an opportunity in the Committee for further discussion of the safeguards program when the Commission meets with the committee in executive session on October 24.

Sincerely yours,

Glenn,
GLENN T. SEABORG.

OCTOBER 18, 1963.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Re reductions of risks and disadvantages of the limited test ban treaty.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: My letter to you dated September 24, 1963, concerning the above-captioned matter has just been answered by Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Dr. Glenn Seaborg, under date of October 17, 1963.

Dr. Seaborg's letter states your administration is seeking authorization to make the following treaty safeguards expenditures during the balance of fiscal year 1964:

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, New Mexico:	
Occupational health labora- tory.....	\$1,650,000
High temperature chemistry facility.....	1,435,000
Plutonium research support building.....	655,000
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, Calif.	
Radiochemistry building.....	5,900,000
Hazards control addition.....	1,000,000
Plant engineering and serv- ices building.....	1,400,000
West cafeteria addition.....	255,000
Craft shop addition.....	200,000
Sandia Base, New Mexico:	
Development laboratory.....	3,780,000
Explosive facilities.....	540,000
Classified technical reports building (addition).....	500,000
Nevada test site:	
Control point additions.....	630,000
Total.....	17,945,000

Dr. Seaborg's letter also indicates that a request for appropriation of \$5,945,000 will be made and that the remaining \$12 million of the total sum of \$17,945,000 will be obtained by reallocating money already appropriated for other purposes.

For the purposes of comparison, I have prepared the following table setting out the sums I have estimated are necessary to establish the treaty safeguards you have promised and sums you requested on October 16:

Action required by promised safeguards	Cost esti- mated in Sept. 24, 1963, letter to you	Your Oct. 16, 1963, request	Per- cent
Underground test site improvement and additions.....	\$100,000,000	\$630,000	0.63
Weapons Labora- tory improve- ments and reten- tion of top flight scientists.....	160,000,000	17,315,000	10.82
Readiness for at- mospheric tests resumption capa- bility.....	610,000,000	0	0
Detection system improvements and miscel- laneous.....	130,000,000	0	0
Total.....	1,000,000,000	17,945,000	1.79

This table indicates a serious discrepancy between your views and mine as to the actions required to implement the safeguards, their costs and as to the permissible delay in implementing them. This discrepancy is further enlarged by my estimate that, in addition to the original investment, at least one-fourth billion dollars must be spent

annually to maintain the safeguards in operational efficiency.

Inasmuch as statements by yourself and members of your administration raise no question as to the necessity for establishing the safeguards, the difference between my views and yours seem to lie in the following areas:

1. What actions are necessary to establish the safeguards?

2. How urgent is it to establish them without delay?

3. How much will they cost?

These are very grave questions concerning which I believe the American people are entitled to know your views in detail. I feel they also are entitled to reassurance that the \$12 million reallocation above mentioned is not from items essential to the national security.

Dr. Seaborg's letter, I presume, indicated only a part of what you may have in mind relative to investments at the laboratories and for underground test site facilities. It was wholly silent as to what you may have in mind respecting the creation and maintenance of readiness for prompt resumption of atmospheric testing under emergency conditions. It also was wholly silent as to what you may have in mind respecting the improvement of our capability to detect possible violations of the treaty and to monitor Soviet nuclear weapons improvements.

I sincerely hope you will avail yourself of an opportunity to reveal to the Nation your thinking on these important matters, either in a comprehensive reply to this letter or otherwise.

I make this request because the amount you are presently seeking for implementation of the safeguards is such a small fraction of what many believe is needed that it raises doubts that the entire matter of the safeguards are being taken seriously by those who may be advising you in these matters.

I make this request also because there is no assurance that Soviet scientists have not already embarked on a clandestine program of secret developments aimed at overpowering U.S. capability in every category of nuclear weapons; there can be no assurance on this point until the promised safeguards are fully in being; and, until they are, an open invitation to the Kremlin is outstanding to get away with anything and everything we cannot detect or discover.

Very truly yours,

CRAIG HOSMER.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, D.C., November 5, 1963.

HON. CRAIG HOSMER,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. HOSMER: In reply to your letter to the President dated October 18, in regard to the limited test ban treaty, I understand that the hearing last week before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the 1964 supplemental appropriations offered an opportunity for a full and lengthy exchange between you and the members and staff of the Atomic Energy Commission with respect to the questions you raised in your letter.

Sincerely,

CHARLES E. JOHNSON.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., November 12, 1963.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Re reductions of risks and disadvantages of the limited test ban treaty.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I wrote you relative to the above-captioned matter in detail